I declare the following statement to be true and correct.

1. My name is Karen Parker.

2. My address and telephone number are:


3. I have been asked by attorneys for plaintiffs to write this opinion.

4. I am an attorney specializing in international law, human rights and humanitarian (armed conflict) law. I am a member of the State Bar of California, number 112486.

5. I received a Juris Doctor (Honors) from the University of San Francisco School of Law in 1983.

6. I received a Diplome (cum laude) in Droit International et de Droit Compare des Droits de l'Homme (International and Comparative Law of Human Rights) from the Institut International des Droits de l'homme (Strasbourg, France) in 1982.

7. I was a legal intern at the Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in 1981 and 1982 (Summers), and wrote memoranda on human rights and humanitarian law issues then before the Commission.

8. I was a judicial extern at the California Supreme Court (chambers of Justice Frank Newman) from August 1982 until Justice Newman's retirement from the bench in December 1982.

9. I have been accepted as an expert witness on international law before the Tokyo High Court (Japan); the Court of Norway (Oslo second instance); before the United States Magistrates in San Francisco; in immigration proceedings in Harlingen, Texas; San Francisco, California; Los Angeles, California; Washington, D.C.; Baltimore, Maryland; Omaha Nebraska; and in several state courts in California. See, e.g In the Matter of Santos-Gomez, Immigration Court for Washington, D.C., Case #A29564-781, 785, 801 at p. 3 accepting Karen Parker as expert citing Fed. R. Evid.

10. My views on international law have been cited in several judicial opinions, including Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); In the Matter of Jesus del Carmen Medina, Immigration Court for Harlingen Texas, Case # 26 949 415 (1985); and In the Matter of Santos-Gomez, Immigration Court for Washington, D.C., Case #A29564-781, 785, 801 (1990).

11. I have testified at hearings of the United States Congress addressing human rights and humanitarian law in Sri Lanka, in Burma and on the work of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (see attached publications list) and have been invited by members of the United States Congress to give briefings on a number of occasions at the request of Senators Di Concini and Leahy and Representatives Porter, Lantos, Dellums, Levine, Richardson and Moakly. I have also made presentations at the Assemblee National of France and have briefed members of the Japanese Diet and the parliaments of United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Russia, Mexico, and El Salvador.

12. I have represented human rights and humanitarian law concerns at the United Nations since 1982, representing, inter alia, International Education Development/Humanitarian Law Project, Disabled Peoples' International, and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. I have represented Disabled Peoples' International, the Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (Paris), Chile Humanitarian Aid, the Humanitarian Law Project/International Educational Development, and the Confederation de Nacionalidades Indigenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana on behalf of the Huaorani Nation at the Organization of American States.

13. From 1983 to 1986 I was a consulting attorney (pro bono) to Mr. Gervase Coles, at the time Chief Legal Council, Office of Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

14. I write reports and articles for publication in American and foreign law and professional journals and for presentation to the United Nations and to governments. I have written more than thirty statements published by the United Nations. A list of some publications is attached to this statement.

15. In the past ten years I have given lectures or classes on international law at many law schools, including the law schools at Harvard University, the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of California at Los Angeles, Hastings College of the Law, the University of San Francisco, Stanford University, Santa Clara University, the New College of the Law, Illinois State University, the University of Denver, Washington University, the University of Iowa, Drake University, American University, Franklin Pierce University, Southern Illinois University, the University of San Diego, the University of Arizona, the University of New Mexico, Arizona State University, John Marshall College of Law, Loyola (Los Angeles), and the University of Southern California. I have also given several hundred lectures at community forums and Universities in nearly thirty states of the United States and in at least fourteen countries.

16. I have been invited by the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations and other legal groups in Japan to carry out investigation of and to prepare reports and studies on non- compliance of Japan of human rights and humanitarian law norms. I was a speaker at the 10 December 1993 Symposium "War and Human Rights--Legal Analysis on Post-War Settlement" sponsored by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations.

17. Expert opinion is a source of international law. Stat. International Court of Justice, art. 38 (d).

18. I state that the questions of international law presented to me by counsel for plaintiffs fall within the area of law about which I have been determined by courts to be expert.

19. The international law questions in this case are

(a) whether the jugun ianfu scheme violated international law at the time it was operating;

(b) whether women and girls forced to participate in the jugun ianfu scheme have a right to compensation awarded by this Court.

20. In presenting my opinion on this question I will assume and acknowledge that:

(a) Japan was a party to the Hague Convention of 1907 (The Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) and Annexed Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631 (the Hague Convention or the Hague Regulations)) at all times between 1937 and 1945 and was accordingly bound by its

(b) Japan was bound by customary international law in force between 1937 and 1945 and by that special body of customary international laws referred to as fundamental principles of law as in force between 1939 and 1945. Japan is currently bound by customary international law and fundamental principles of law in force now.

21. In my opinion the acts alleged by plaintiffs were violations of international law at the time they were committed and the plaintiffs in this suit have a right to compensation awarded by this Court as victims of the jugun ianfu scheme. The following defends this opinion.


22. The Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes customary international law and fundamental principles of law as sources of international law. (Stat. International Court of Justice, art. 38). This article duplicates a similar article in the earlier statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The sources of international law set out in these statutes had been universally recognized for at least several centuries. Under universally recognized principles of international law, customary international law and fundamental principles of law are legally binding on all states. While some few exceptions to customary norms are allowed as in the case of the "persistent objector", customary law that is viewed as jus cogens or that gives rise to obligations erga omnes are absolute and not subject to any exception. (See Karen Parker & Lyn B.Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 411 (1989)(available in the Japanese language)).

23. Under the jugun ianfu scheme, the government of Japan abducted or fraudulently induced the recruitment of women and girls from territories under Japanese occupation, transported them away from their homes, detained them in special facilities, and allowed its soldiers to repeatedly rape them. A significant number of women and girls were murdered outright or allowed to die of injuries or starvation. Most were beaten and grossly abused. Many were forced to watch other women and girls murdered, beaten or abused. Food and medical care for them was grossly inadequate. Their living conditions were atrocious. In sum, the jugun ianfu scheme represented the nadir of inhumanity.

24. In legal terms, victims of the jugun ianfu scheme, were murdered, deported, enslaved, imprisoned, tortured by rape and other forms of torture, and subjected to inhumane acts.

25. During World War II these acts were determined by international legal experts and scholars to be violations of international law binding on all nations at that time. They were identified as war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Control Council Law No. 10, (Control Council Law, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Jan. 1946, reprinted in 1 The Law of War: A Documentary History (L. Friedman, ed., 1971)), the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, in force Aug. 8, 1945, 3 Bevans 1238, 1240 (Nuremberg Charter)), and the Charter of the Military Tribunal for the Far East (The Charter of the Military Tribunal for the Far East, 4 Bevans 20, 27 (Tokyo Charter)). The definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter reads:

(b) war crimes: namely, violations of the laws and customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation for slave labour or for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied territory . . ..

(c) crimes against humanity: namely, murder . . . enslavement, deportation or other inhumane acts against the civilian population, before or during the war. (Nuremberg Charter, op.cit., art. VI (b) & (c)).

26. The Tokyo Charter duplicates the language in the definition of crimes against humanity and does not list any examples under the definition of war crimes. Tokyo Charter, op. cit., art. 5 (b) & (c). Control Council Law 10 lists some inhumane acts: "(c) crimes against humanity [are[ atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape or other inhumane acts committed against the civilian population." Control Council Law 10, op. cit. art. II (c).

27. The finding that the acts at issue in this case constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity provided the basis for jurisdiction for the international tribunals, and the tribunals proceeded with complete acceptance of that legal status. There is no possible legal argument that could be made to deny that these acts did not violate then-existing law. The understanding that these acts violated then-existing law was also the basis for establishing compensation schemes for Germany's victims, including war-rape victims as will be referred to below.

28. Neither the Charters nor Control Council Law No. 10 set out historical and legal precedents to support their finding of then- existing customary law. I herein incorporate into this Opinion the section entitled "Violations of Then-existing Customary International Law" in my article Compensation for Japan's World War II War-Rape Victims (Karen Parker & Jennifer Chew,, 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 497, 510-523 (1994) (available in the Japanese language)) which sets out historical and legal precedents dating from the Middle Ages showing that the acts listed in the Charters and Control Council Law violated customary international law long before World War II. This section incorporates the legal writings of Belli, Gentili and Grotius; a summary of international action against slavery and white slavery; the Hague Convention of 1907 (The Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) and Annexed Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907 (Hague Convention or Hague Regulations); and the post-World War I Versailles Commission's listing of these acts as crimes of the "established customs [and the] clear dictates of humanity." (Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and the Enforcement of Penalties (Versailles Commission), reprinted in 14 Am. J. Int'l L. 95 (Supp. 1920)). This section finds that the acts of Japan under the jugun ianfu scheme were violations of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. It then shows how the post- World War II development of human rights and humanitarian law reflects the common understanding that the acts in question constitute clear violations of international law.

29. In this light I wish to point out that the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, established by the United Nations Security Council by its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 utilizes essentially the same listing of war crimes and crimes against humanity as in the earlier Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. One major crime presented to the current Tribunal is a pattern of war-rape similar to Japan's jugun ianfu scheme. War-rape is also a prominent violation raised before the bench of the Tribunal established to address crimes in Rwanda.

30. In my opinion no lawyer, judge, scholar or government of the World War II era could ethically maintain that the acts carried out under the jugun ianfu scheme did not violate then- existing international law. The Japanese government was well aware of the condemnation of essential elements of the jugun ianfu scheme formally in 1938 when the Home Ministry sent a letter expressing concern that the "recruitment activities" of the programme were "counter to the spirit of the international convention for prohibiting the trade in women." Letter, Feb. 23, 1938, reprinted in Brothels were Controlled to Preserve Military Honor, Japan Times, Aug. 6, 1992 at 3. That any lawyer, judge, scholar or government could today defend such acts in the course of World War II is unthinkable.